Violence and the Word by Cover, Robert M
Essays
Violence and the Word
Robert M. Coverf
I. INTRODUCTION: THE VIOLENCE OF LEGAL ACTS
Legal interpretation' takes place in a field of pain and death. This is
true in several senses. Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the im-
position of violence upon others: A judge articulates her understanding of
a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his chil-
dren, even his life. Interpretations in law also constitute justifications for
violence which has already occurred or which is about to occur. When
interpreters have finished their work, they frequently leave behind victims
whose lives have been torn apart by these organized, social practices of
violence. Neither legal interpretation nor the violence it occasions may be
properly understood apart from one another. This much is obvious,
though the growing literature that argues for the centrality of interpretive
practices in law blithely ignores it.2
t Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale University.
There are always legends of those who came first, who called things by their right names and thus
founded the culture of meaning into which we latecomers are born. Charles Black has been such a
legend, striding across the landscape of law naming things, speaking "with authority." And we who
come after him are eternally grateful.
I wish to thank Harlon Dalton, Susan Koniak and Harry Wellington for having read and com-
mented upon drafts of this essay. Some of the ideas in this essay were developed earlier, in the Brown
Lecture which I delivered at the Georgia School of Law Conference on Interpretation in March,
1986. I am grateful to Milner Ball, Avi Soifer, Richard Weisberg and James Boyd White for com-
ments made in response to that lecture which have helped me in reworking the ideas here.
I am particularly grateful to my summer research assistant, Tracy Fessenden, for research, editorial
and substantive assistance of the highest order.
I. I have used the term "legal interpretation" throughout this essay, though my argument is di-
rected principally to the interpretive acts of judges. To this specifically judicial interpretation my
analysis of institutional action applies with special force. Nonetheless, I believe the more general term
"legal interpretation" is warranted, for it is my position that the violence which judges deploy as
instruments of a modern nation-state necessarily engages anyone who interprets the law in a course of
conduct that entails either the perpetration or the suffering of this violence.
2. There has been a recent explosion of legal scholarship placing interpretation at the crux of the
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Taken by itself, the word "interpretation" may be misleading. "Inter-
pretation" suggests a social construction of an interpersonal reality
through language. But pain and death have quite other implications. In-
deed, pain and death destroy the world that "interpretation" calls up.
That one's ability to construct interpersonal realities is destroyed by death
is obvious, but in this case, what is true of death is true of pain also, for
pain destroys, among other things, language itself. Elaine Scarry's bril-
liant analysis of pain makes this point:
[F]or the person, in pain, so incontestably and unnegotiably present
is it that "having pain" may come to be thought of as the most vi-
brant example of what it is to "have certainty," while for the other
person it is so elusive that hearing about pain may exist as the pri-
mary model of what it is "to have doubt." Thus pain comes un-
shareably into our midst as at once that which cannot be denied and
that which cannot be confirmed. Whatever pain achieves, it achieves
in part through its unshareability, and it ensures this unshareability
enterprise of law. A fair sampling of that work may be seen in the various articles that have appeared
in two symposia. Symposium: Law and Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 373 (1982); Interpretation
Symposium, 58 S. CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1985) (published in two issues). The intense interest in "inter-
pretation" or "hermeneutics" in recent legal scholarship is quite a different phenomenon from the
traditional set of questions about how a particular word, phrase, or instrument should be given effect
in some particular context. It is, rather, the study of what I have called "a normative universe...
held together by . . . interpretive commitments . . . ." Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4, 7 (1983). Or, in Ronald Dworkin's
words, it is the study of the effort "to impose meaning on the institution. . . and then to restructure
it in the light of that meaning." R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 47 (1986) (emphasis in original).
Dworkin, in Law's Empire, has written the most elaborate and sophisticated jurisprudence which
places the meaning-giving, constructive dimension of interpretation at the heart of law. James Boyd
White has been another eloquent voice claiming primacy for what he has called the "culture of argu-
ment." White has raised rhetoric to the pinnacle of jurisprudence. See J.B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS
LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984); J.B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow (1985).
The violent side of law and its connection to interpretation and rhetoric is systematically ignored or
underplayed in the work of both Dworkin and White. White, in chapter nine of Heracles' Bow,
comes closest to the concerns of this essay. He launches a critique of the practice of criminal law in
terms of its unintelligibility as a "system of meaning" in the absence of significant reforms. White
does not see violence as central to the breakdown of the system of meaning. But he does contrast what
the judge says with what he does in the saying of it. Still, White reiterates in this book his central
claim that "law . . . is best regarded not as a machine for social'control, but as what I call a system
of constitutive rhetoric: a set of resources for claiming, resisting, and declaring significance." Id. at
205. I do not deny that law is all those things that White claims, but I insist that it is those things in
the context of the organized social practice of violence. And the "significance" or meaning that is
achieved must be experienced or understood in vastly different ways depending upon whether one
suffers that violence or not. In Nomos and Narrative, I also emphasized the world-building character
of interpretive commitments in law. However, the thrust of Nomos was that the creation of legal
meaning is an essentially cultural activity which takes place (or best takes place) among smallish
groups. Such meaning-creating activity is not naturally coextensive with the range of effective violence
used to achieve social control. Thus, because law is the attempt to build future worlds, the essential
tension in law is between the elaboration of legal meaning and the exercise of or resistance to the
violence of social control. Cover, supra, at 18: "[T]here is a radical dichotomy between the social
organization of law as power and the organization of law as meaning." This essay elaborates the
senses in which the traditional forms of legal decision cannot be easily captured by the idea of inter-
pretation understood as interpretation normally is in literature, the arts, or the humanities.
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in part through its resistance to language . . . .Prolonged pain does
not simply resist language but actively destroys it, bringing about an
immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds
and cries a human being makes before language is learned.3
The deliberate infliction of pain in order to destroy the victim's norma-
tive world and capacity to create shared realities we call torture. The in-
terrogation that is part of torture, Scarry points out, is rarely designed to
elicit information. More commonly, the torturer's interrogation is designed
to demonstrate the end of the normative world of the victim-the end of
what the victim values, the end of the bonds that constitute the community
in which the values are grounded. Scarry thus concludes that "in compel-
ling confession, the torturers compel the prisoner to record and objectify
the fact that intense pain is world-destroying."' 4 That is why torturers
almost always require betrayal-a demonstration that the victim's intangi-
ble normative world has been crushed by the material reality of pain and
its extension, fear.5 The torturer and victim do end up creating their own
terrible "world," but this world derives its meaning from being imposed
upon the ashes of another.' The logic of that world is complete domina-
tion, though the objective may never be realized.
Whenever the normative world of a community survives fear, pain, and
death in their more extreme forms, that very survival is understood to be
literally miraculous both by those who have experienced and by those who
vividly imagine or recreate the suffering. Thus, of the suffering of sainted
Catholic martyrs it was written:
We must include also ... the deeds of the saints in which their
3. E. S(ARRY, THE. BODY IN PAIN 4 (1985).
4. Id. at 29.
5. Id.
Pain and interrogation inevitably occur together in part because the torturer and the prisoner
each experience them as opposites. The very question that, within the political pretense, mat-
ters so much to the torturer that it occasions his grotesque brutality will matter so little to the
prisoner experiencing the brutality that he will give the answer. For the torturers, the sheer
and simple fact of human agony is made invisible, and the moral fact of inflicting that agony is
made neutral by the feigned urgency and significance of the question. For the prisoner, the
sheer, simple, overwhelming fact of his agony will make neutral and invisible the significance
of any question as well as the significance of the world to which the question refers . . . .It is
for this reason that while the content of the prisoner's answer is only sometimes important to
the regime, the form of the answer, the fact of his answering, is always crucial. ... [In
confession, one betrays oneself and all those aspects of the world-friend, family, country,
cause-that the self is made up of.
Id. While pain is the extreme form of world destruction, fear may be as potent, even if not connected
to physical pain and torture. The fact of answering and the necessity for "world destruction" through
betrayal were also central to the reign of fear of McCarthyism. See, e.g., V. NAVASKY, NAMING
NAMES 346 (1980) (informer destroys "the very possibility of a community ... for the informer
operates on the principle of betrayal and a community survives on the principle of trust").
6. On the "fiction of power" that torture creates, see E. SCARRY, supra note 3, at 56-58.
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triumph blazed forth through the many forms of torture that they
underwent and their marvelous confession of the faith. For what
Catholic can doubt that they suffered more than is possible for
human beings to bear, and did not endure this by their own strength,
but by the grace and help of God?'
And Jews, each year on Yom Kippur, remember-
Rabbi Akiba. . .chose to continue teaching in spite of the decree
[of the Romans forbidding it]. When they led him to the executioner,
it was time for reciting the Sh'ma. With iron combs they scraped
away his skin as he recited Sh'ma Yisrael, freely accepting the yoke
of God's Kingship. "Even now?" his disciples asked. He replied:
"All my life I have been troubled by a verse: 'Love the Lord your
God with all your heart and with all your soul,' which means even if
He take your life. I often wondered if I would ever fulfill that obli-
gation. And now I can." He left the world while uttering, "The
Lord is One.""
Martyrdom, for all its strangeness to the secular world of contemporary
American Law, is a proper starting place for understanding the nature of
legal interpretation. Precisely because it is so extreme a phenomenon,
martyrdom helps us see what is present in lesser degree whenever inter-
pretation is joined with the practice of violent domination. Martyrs insist
in the face of overwhelming force that if there is to be continuing life, it
will not be on the terms of the tyrant's law. Law is the projection of an
imagined future upon reality. Martyrs require that any future they pos-
sess will be on the terms of the law to which they are committed (God's
law). And the miracle of the suffering of the martyrs is their insistence on
the law to which they are committed, even in the face of world-destroying
pain.9 Their triumph-which may well be partly imaginary-is the
imagined triumph of the normative universe-of Torah, Nomos,-over
7. P. BROWN, THE CULT OF THE SAINTS 79 (1981) (emphasis added) (quoting from the
DECRE'UM GEI.ASIANUM, PATROLOGIA LATINA 59.171).
8. The quotation is from the traditional Eilch Ezkerah or martyrology service of Yom Kippur. I
have quoted from the translation used in MAHZOR FOR ROSH HASHANAH AND YoM KIPPUR, A
PRAYER BOOK FOR THE DAYS OF AWE 555-57 (J. Harlow ed. 1972).
9. The word "martyr" stems from the Greek root martys, "witness," and from the Aryan root
smer, "to remember." Martyrdom functions as a re-membering when the martyr, in the act of wit-
nessing, sacrifices herself on behalf of the normative universe which is thereby reconstituted, regener-
ated, or recreated. One of the earliest sources dealing with martyrdom as a religious phenomenon, 2
MACCABEES, stresses the characteristic of the phenomenon as an insistence on the integrity of the Law
of the martyr and of obligation to it in the face of overpowering violence. At one point the book
describes the horrible torture and killing of seven sons before their mother's eyes, each death more
horrible than the one before. The last and youngest child, encouraged by his mother, answers the
King's demand to eat pork with the words: "I will not submit to the King's command; I obey the
command of the law given by Moses to our ancestors." 2 MACCABEES 7.30.
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the material world of death and pain. 10 Martyrdom is an extreme form of
resistance to domination. As such it reminds us that the normative world-
building which constitutes "Law" is never just a mental or spiritual act. A
legal world is built only to the extent that there are commitments that
place bodies on the line. The torture of the martyr is an extreme and
repulsive form of the organized violence of institutions. It reminds us that
the interpretive commitments of officials are realized, indeed, in the flesh.
As long as that is so, the interpretive commitments of a community which
resists official law must also be realized in the flesh, even if it be the flesh
of its own adherents.
Martyrdom is not the only possible response of a group that has failed
to adjust to or accept domination while sharing a physical space. Rebel-
lion and revolution are alternative responses when conditions make such
acts feasible and when there is a willingness not only to die but also to kill
for an understanding of the normative future that differs from that of the
dominating power.11
Our own constitutional history begins with such an act of rebellion.
The act was, in form, an essay in constitutional interpretation affirming
the right of political independence from Great Britain:
We therefore the representatives of the United States of America in
General Congress assembled, appealing to the supreme judge of the
world for the rectitude of our intentions, do in the name, and by the
authority of the good people of these colonies, solemnly publish and
declare that these United Colonies are and of right ought to be free
and independent states; that they are absolved from all allegiance to
the British crown, and that all political connection between them and
the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved.12
10. In extreme cases martyrdom may be affirmatively sought out, for it is the final proof of the
capacity of the spirit to triumph over the body. That triumph may be seen as a triumph of love or of
law or of both, depending upon the dominant motifs of the normative and religious world of the
martyr and her community. The great jurist and mystic, Joseph Karo (1488-1578), had ecstatic
dreams of martyrdom and was promised the privilege of dying a martyr by a "maggid"-a celestial
messenger who spoke through his mouth and appeared to him in visions. (The promise was not
fulfilled. He died of very old age.) See Z. WERBLOWSKI, JOSEPH KARO: LAWYER AND MYSTIC
151-54 (2d ed. 1977). Note also the phenomenon of communities slaughtering themselves in the face
of an enemy. Compare the complex mythos of the Jewish martyrs before the crusaders, elaborated in
S. SI'w;Ei., THE LAST TRIAL: ON THE LEGENDS AND LORE OF THE COMMAND TO ABRAHAM TO
OFFER ISSAC: AS A SACRIFICE: THE AKEDAH (J. Goldin trans. 1969) with the myth of the White
Night enacted by Jonestown in our own day, recounted in J. SMIn, IMAGINING RELIGION: FROM
BABY.ON TO JONESTOWN 102-20, 126-34 (1982).
11. The archetype for the transition from martyrdom to resistance is found in I MACCABEES,
with the dramatic killing carried out by the Priest Matathias in Modi'in. 1 MACCABEES 2, 19-28.
His act assumes dramatic significance in the work in part because it stands in marked contrast to the
acts of heroic martyrdom described in 2 MACCABEES. See supra note 9.
12. The Declaration of Independence (1776). For the senses in which the Declaration should be
seen as interpretive of the constitutional position of America in the Empire, see Black, The Constitu-
tion of Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1157 (1976).
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But this interpretive act also incorporated an awareness of the risk of pain
and death that attends so momentous an interpretive occasion:
We mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes and our
sacred honour.
13
Life, fortune, and sacred honour were, of course, precisely the price that
would have been exacted from the conspirators were their act unsuccess-
ful. We too often forget that the leaders of the rebellion had certainly
committed treason from the English constitutional perspective. And con-
viction of treason carried with it a horrible and degrading death, forfeiture
of estate, and corruption of the blood."' Great issues of constitutional in-
terpretation that reflect fundamental questions of political allegiance-the
American Revolution, the secession of the States of the Confederacy, or
the uprising of the Plains Indians-clearly carry the seeds of violence
(pain and death) at least from the moment that the understanding of the
political texts becomes embedded in the institutional capacity to take col-
lective action. But it is precisely this embedding of an understanding of
political text in institutional modes of action that distinguishes legal inter-
pretation from the interpretation of literature, from political philosophy,
and from constitutional criticism.15 Legal interpretation is either played
13. The Declaration of Independence (1776).
14. See IV BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES *92-93:
The punishment of high treason in general is very solemn and terrible. 1. That the offender
be drawn to the gallows, and not be carried or walk; though usually (by connivance, at length
ripened by humanity into law) a sledge or hurdle is allowed, to preserve the offender from the
extreme torment of being dragged on the ground or pavement. 2. That he be hanged by the
neck, and then cut down alive. 3. That his entrails be taken out, and burned, while yet he is
alive. 4. That his head be cut off. 5. That his body be divided into four parts. 6. That his head
and quarters be at the king's disposal.
On forfeiture and corruption of the blood, see id. at *388-96. It is, therefore, not unexpected that
among the few specific protections incorporated into the body of the original Constitution were those
which closely defined treason, set procedural safeguards for conviction of treason, and forbade the
extension of attaint and corruption of the blood as vicarious punishment upon the family or descend-
ants of those convicted of treason.
15. Every interpretive practice takes place in some context. Among recent critics, Stanley Fish has
been as insistent as any concerning the dominance of institutional contexts even in understanding
literary texts. See generally S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980); Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36
STAN. L. REv. 1325, 1332 (1984) ("To be. . . 'deeply inside' a context is to be already and always
thinking (and perceiving) with and within the norms, standards, definitions, routines, and understood
goals that both define and are defined by that context."). I do not wish to dispute Fish's central point
about literature. I do think, however, that the institutions that are designed to realize normative fu-
tures in part through the practice of collective violence stand on a somewhat different footing than do
those which bear only a remote or incidental relation to the violence of society. I am prepared to
entertain views such as those of Fredric Jameson, who argues for "the priority of the political inter-
pretation of literary texts." F. JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS: NARRATIVE AS A SOCIALLY
SYMBOI.I Acr 17 (1981). But while asserting the special place of a political understanding of our
social reality, such views do not in any way claim for literary interpretations what I am claiming
about legal interpretation-that it is part of the practice of political violence.
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out on the field of pain and death or it is something less (or more) than
law.
Revolutionary constitutional understandings are commonly staked in
blood. In them, the violence of the law takes its most blatant form. But the
relationship between legal interpretation and the infliction of pain re-
mains operative even in the most routine of legal acts. The act of sentenc-
ing a convicted defendant is among these most routine of acts performed
by judges.18 Yet it is immensely revealing of the way in which interpreta-
tion is distinctively shaped by violence. First, examine the event from the
perspective of the defendant. The defendant's world is threatened. But he
sits, usually quietly, as if engaged in a civil discourse. If convicted, the
defendant customarily walks-escorted-to prolonged confinement, usu-
ally without significant disturbance to the civil appearance of the event. It
is, of course, grotesque to assume that the civil facade is "voluntary" ex-
cept in the sense that it represents the defendant's autonomous recognition
of the overwhelming array of violence ranged against him, and of the
hopelessness of resistance or outcry.
17
There are societies in which contrition or shame control defendants'
behavior to a greater extent than does violence. Such societies require and
have received their own distinctive form of analysis."' But I think it is
unquestionably the case in the United States that most prisoners walk into
prison because they know they will be dragged or beaten into prison if
they do not walk. They do not organize force against being dragged be-
16. I have used the criminal law for examples throughout this essay for a simple reason. The
violence of the criminal law is relatively direct. If my argument is not persuasive in this context, it
will be less persuasive in most other contexts. I would be prepared to argue that all law which
concerns property, its use and its protection, has a similarly violent base. But in many, perhaps most,
highly visible legal transactions concerning property rights, that violent foundation is not immediately
at issue. My argument does not, I believe, require that every interpretive event in law have the kind of
direct violent impact on participants that a criminal trial has. It is enough that it is the case that
where people care passionately about outcomes and are prepared to act on their concern, the law
officials of the nation state are usually willing and able to use either criminal or violent civil sanctions
to control behavior.
17. A few defendants who have reached their own understandings of the legal order have overtly
attempted to deny the fiction that the trial is a joint or communal civil event where interpretations of
facts and legal concepts are tested and refined. The playing out of such an overt course of action ends
with the defendant physically bound and gagged. Bobby Seale taught those of us who lived through
the 1960's that the court's physical control over the defendant's body lies at the heart of the criminal
process. The defendant's "civil conduct," therefore, can never signify a shared understanding of the
event; it may signify his fear that any public display of his interpretation of the event as "bullshit"
will end in violence perpetrated against him, pain inflicted upon him. Our constitutional law, quite
naturally enough, provides for the calibrated use of ascending degrees of overt violence to maintain the
"order" of the criminal trial. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); Tigar, The Supreme
Court, 1969 Term-Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 1-3, 10-11 (1970) (commenting in part upon Allen).
18. On the distinction between "shame cultures" and "guilt cultures," see generally E. DoDDs,
THE GREEKS AND THE IRRATIONAL (1951), and J. REDFIELD, NATURE AND CULTURE IN THE
I.IAD (1975). For an analysis of a modern "shame culture," see R. BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHE-
MUM AND THE SWORD: PATTERNS OF JAPANESE CULTURE (1946).
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cause they know that if they wage this kind of battle they will lose-very
possibly lose their lives.
If I have exhibited some sense of sympathy for the victims of this vio-
lence it is misleading. Very often the balance of terror in this regard is
just as I would want it. But I do not wish us to pretend that we talk our
prisoners into jail. The "interpretations" or "conversations" that are the
preconditions for violent incarceration are themselves implements of vio-
lence. To obscure this fact is precisely analogous to ignoring the back-
ground screams or visible instruments of torture in an inquisitor's interro-
gation. The experience of the prisoner is, from the outset, an experience of
being violently dominated, and it is colored from the beginning by the fear
of being violently treated.19
The violence of the act of sentencing is most obvious when observed
from the defendant's perspective. Therefore, any account which seeks to
downplay the violence or elevate the interpretive character or meaning of
the event within a community of shared values will tend to ignore the
prisoner or defendant and focus upon the judge and the judicial interpre-
tive act. Beginning with broad interpretive categories such as "blame" or
"punishment," meaning is created for the event which justifies the judge
to herself and to others with respect to her role in the acts of violence. I do
not wish to downplay the significance of such ideological functions of law.
But the function of ideology is much more significant in justifying an or-
der to those who principally benefit from it and who must defend it than
it is in hiding the nature of the order from those who are its victims.
The ideology of punishment is not, of course, the exclusive property of
judges. The concept operates in the general culture and is intelligible to
and shared by prisoners, criminals and revolutionaries as well as judges.
Why, then, should we not conclude that interpretation is the master con-
cept of law, that the interpretive work of understanding "punishment"
may be seen as mediating or making sense of the opposing acts and exper-
iences of judge and defendant in the criminal trial? Naturally, one who is
to be punished may have to be coerced. And punishment, if it is "just,"
supposedly legitimates the coercion or violence applied. The ideology of
punishment may, then, operate successfully to justify our practices of
criminal law to ourselves and, possibly, even to those who are or may
come to be "punished" by the law.
There is, however, a fundamental difference between the way in which
"punishment" operates as an ideology in popular or professional litera-
ture, in political debate, or in general discourse, and the way in which it
19. This point and others very similar to it are made routinely in the literature that comes out of
prisons. See, e.g., E. CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 128-30 (1968); J. WASHINGTON, A BRIGHT SPOT IN
THE YARD: NOTES & STORIES FROM A PRISON JOURNAL 5 (1981).
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operates in the context of the legal acts of trial, imposition of sentence,
and execution. For as the judge interprets, using the concept of punish-
ment, she also acts-through others-to restrain, hurt, render helpless,
even kill the prisoner. Thus, any commonality of interpretation that may
or may not be achieved is one that has its common meaning destroyed by
the divergent experiences that constitute it. Just as the torturer and victim
achieve a "shared" world only by virtue of their diametrically opposed
experiences, so the judge and prisoner understand "punishment" through
their diametrically opposed experiences of the punishing act. It is ulti-
mately irrelevant whether the torturer and his victim share a common
theoretical view on the justifications for torture-outside the torture room.
They still have come to the confession through destroying in the one case
and through having been destroyed in the other. Similarly, whether or not
the judge and prisoner share the same philosophy of punishment, they
arrive at the particular act of punishment having dominated and having
been dominated with violence, respectively.
II. THE ACTS OF JUDGES: INTERPRETATIONS, DEEDS AND ROLES
We begin, then, not with what the judges say, but with what they do.
The judges deal pain and death.
That is not all that they do. Perhaps that is not what they usually do.
But they do deal death, and pain. From John Winthrop through Warren
Burger they have sat atop a pyramid of violence, dealing ....
In this they are different from poets, from critics, from artists. It will
not do to insist on the violence of strong poetry, and strong poets. Even the
violence of weak judges is utterly real-a naive but immediate reality, in
need of no interpretation, no critic to reveal it.20 Every prisoner displays
20. On the violence that strong poets do to their literary ancestors, see H. BLOOM, THE ANXIETY
OF INFI.UENCE (1973), H. BLOOM, THE BREAKING OF THE VESSELS (1982), and much of Bloom's
other work since Anxiety. Judges, like all readers and writers of texts, do violence to their liter-
ary-i.e., judicial-forebearers. For an interesting application of Bloom's central thesis to law, see D.
Cole, Agon and Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857
(1986). Cole acknowledges that the connection of law to violence distinguishes legal from literary
interpretation, though he does not, unfortunately, develop the point. Id. at 904.
The anxiety of juridical influence was rather aptly and nicely stated somewhat earlier by Learned
Hand in his tribute to Cardozo, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 9 (1939). My point here is
not that judges do not do the kind of figurative violence to literary parents that poets do, but that they
carry out-in addition-a far more literal form of violence through their interpretations that poets do
not share. It is significant, and has been much noted, that the immediacy of the connection between
judge and violence of punishment has changed over the centuries. See, e.g., M. FOUCAULT, DISCI-
PLINE AND PuNIsH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (A. Sheridan trans. 1977). Certainly in the United
States today, the judge's obvious responsibility for the violence of punishment requires an apprecia-
tion-which all who live in this society acquire-of the organizational form of action. In that sense
"naive" reality should not be taken to signify too much. One need not be sophisticated to understand
the violence of judging, but neither is it as naive a form of violence as it would be if judges carried out
their own sentencing. On the implications of this point, see infra pp. 1626-27.
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its mark. Whether or not the violence of judges is justified is not now the
point-only that it exists in fact and differs from the violence that exists
in literature or in the metaphoric characterizations of literary critics and
philosophers. I have written elsewhere that judges of the state are juris-
pathic-that they kill the diverse legal traditions that compete with the
State.2 ' Here, however, I am not writing of the jurispathic quality of the
office, but of its homicidal potential.
22
The dual emphasis on the acts of judges and on the violence of these
acts leads to consideration of three characteristics of the interpretive di-
mension of judicial behavior. Legal interpretation is (1) a practical activ-
ity, (2) designed to generate credible threats and actual deeds of violence,
(3) in an effective way. In order to explore the unseverable connection
between legal interpretation and violence, each of these three elements
must be examined in turn.
A. Legal Interpretation as a Practical Activity
Legal interpretation is a form of practical wisdom.2 3 At its best it seeks
to "impose meaning on the institution . . . and then to restructure it in
the light of that meaning."" There is, however, a persistent chasm be-
21. Cover, supra note 2, at 40-44.
22. The violence of judges and officials of a posited constitutional order is generally understood to
be implicit in the practice of law and government. Violence is so intrinsic to this activity, so taken for
granted, that it need not be mentioned. For instance, read the Constitution. Nowhere does it state, as a
general principle, the obvious-that the government thereby ordained and established has the power
to practice violence over its people. That, as a general proposition, need not be stated, for it is under-
stood in the very idea of government. It is, of course, also directly implicit in many of the specific
powers granted to the general government or to some specified branch or official of it. E.g., U.S.
CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. I ("Power To lay and collect Taxes ...and provide for the common De-
fence"); id., cl. 6 ("To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting"); id., cl. 10 ("To define and
punish Piracies"); id., cl. 11 ("To declare War"); id., cl. 15 ("To provide for calling forth the Militia
to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;"); id., art. IV, § 2, cis.
2-3 (providing for rendition of fugitives from justice and service).
23. On practical wisdom, see ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHIcs 1140a(24) to 1140b(30).
24. R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 47. Dworkin's opus, celebrating what he calls the "integrity"
of coherent and consistent interpretation, stands within a long tradition of work elaborating on Aris-
totle's fundamental insight into the nature of deliberation. Aristotle assigned the broad area of norma-
tive deliberation, of which legal interpretation consists, to practical wisdom or phronesis, which he
distinguished from speculative knowledge. ARISTOTLE, supra note 23, at 1139b(14) to 1140b(30). On
phronesis, see also H. ARENDT, WILLING 59-62 (1977). Practical wisdom, according to Aristotle, is a
form of applied understanding: it does not consist, like knowledge, of pre-existing truths. It entails
deliberation-an activity which is senseless with respect to logical truth. Deliberation engages the
relevance of past to present understandings through a reflexive "discovery" of what is implicit in past
understanding. Technical knowledge also has applied character, but practical wisdom, being in the
normative sphere, cannot be measured by an external standard such as usefulness, because it consists
of the application of understanding to the shaping of self.
Hans Georg Gadamer elevated these characteristics of practical wisdom to the central place in what
he called "the human sciences." H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 5-10 and passim (G. Barden
& J. Cumming eds. 2d ed. 1975). Gadamer found these interpersonal, constructive acts of understand-
ing-hermeneutics or interpretations-most clearly exemplified in what he called "legal dogmatics."
Gadamer's project may be understood in some measure as an attempt to comprehend all human
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tween thought and action. It is one thing to understand what ought to be
done, quite another thing to do it. Doing entails an act of will and may
require courage and perseverance. In the case of an individual's actions,
we commonly think such qualities are functions of motivation, character,
or psychology.
Legal interpretation is practical activity in quite another sense, how-
ever. The judicial word is a mandate for the deeds of others. Were that
not the case, the practical objectives of the deliberative process could be
achieved, if at all, only through more indirect and risky means. The con-
text of a judicial utterance is institutional behavior in which others, occu-
pying preexisting roles, can be expected to act, to implement, or otherwise
to respond in a specified way to the judge's interpretation. Thus, the insti-
tutional context ties the language act of practical understanding to the
physical acts of others in a predictable, though not logically necessary,
way.25 These interpretations, then, are not only "practical," they are,
themselves, practices.
understanding in terms of phronesis; that is, to take the category of applied thought that defines our
situation as moral actors and generalize that situation to include all of life. "Understanding is, then, a
particular case of the application of something universal to a particular situation." Id. at 278.
For Gadamer, Aristotle is the source-the one who places action and striving at the center of moral
philosophy. "Aristotle's description of the ethical phenomenon and especially of the virtue of moral
knowledge . . . is in fact a kind of model of the problems of hermeneutics . . . . Application is
neither a subsequent nor a merely occasional part of the phenomenon of understanding, but
codetermines it as a whole from the beginning." Id. at 289. Gadamer proceeds from Aristotle by
incorporating Heidegger's fundamental insight that we are always situated in the world, building the
future worlds we shall inhabit. We do this through interpretation which is simultaneously a discovery
of what we know and a new understanding of this "known" that enables us to discover more about
what we know. Building on Heidegger, Gadamer posits the unity of all hermeneutics, all interpretive
activity. Because all understanding is a building of both self and the world, it is in some measure
practical and social, and therefore never divorced from ethics.
The practice of legal interpretation by the judge is no different from any other hermeneutic exer-
cise. It exemplifies the mutually and reflexively constructive effects of text, of prior understanding of
text (tradition), of present application and understanding-as-applied, and of future commitment. And
legal dogmatics are for Gadamer the "model for the unity of dogmatic and historical interest and so
also for the unity of hermeneutics as a whole." J. WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS, A
READING OF Truth and Method 194 (1985).
Gadamer's placement of legal dogmatics at the center of the general enterprise of understanding the
human sciences represents an invitation-or perhaps a temptation-to those legal academics who con-
ceive law as the building of a system of normative meaning. If one can begin to understand the entire
world of the humanities, i.e., the many forms of interpretive activity, in terms of law, it should be
possible to put this common element of interpretation at the heart of law itself. That, indeed, seems to
have been the effect of the slow trickle down of ideas about interpretation to the legal academy in
America.
Ronald Dworkin synthesizes these interpretativist ideas in his new work, Law's Empire. R. DWOR-
KIN, supra note 2. Law's Empire is a major elaboration of the reflexive, deliberative form of practical
wisdom rooted in Aristotle's phronesis. It also builds upon Dworkin's own earlier critique of legal
positivism to render "interpretation" the central activity in the judicial act while keeping the judicial
act central to law. I fully agree that the dominant form of legal thought ought to be interpretive in the
extended sense of the term. However, the emergence of interpretation as a central motif does not, by
itself, reflect upon the way in which the interpretive acts of judges are simultaneously performative
utterances in an institutional setting for violent behavior.
25. One might say that institutions create the context for changing the contingent to the necessary.
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Formally, on both a normative and descriptive level, there are or may
be rules and principles which describe the relationship between the inter-
pretive acts of judges and the deeds which may be expected to follow from
them. These rules and principles are what H.L.A. Hart called "secondary
rules."' 26 At least some secondary rules and principles identify the terms of
cooperation between interpretation specialists and other actors in a social
organization. Prescriptive secondary materials purport to set the norms for
what those relations ought to be; descriptive secondary rules and princi-
ples would generate an accurate prediction of what the terms of coopera-
tion actually will be. Of course, in any given system there need be no
particular degree of correspondence between these two sets of rules.
Secondary rules and principles provide the template for transforming
language into action, word into deed. As such they occupy a critical place
in the analysis of legal interpretation proposed here. The legal philoso-
pher may hold up to us a model of a hypothetical judge who is able to
achieve a Herculean understanding of the full body of legal and social
texts relevant to a particular case, and from this understanding to arrive
at the single legally correct decision. But that mental interpretive act
cannot give itself effect. The practice of interpretation requires an under-
standing of what others will do with such a judicial utterance and, in
many instances, an adjustment to that understanding, regardless of how
misguided one may think the likely institutional response will be. Failing
this, the interpreter sacrifices the connection between understanding what
ought to be done and the deed, itself. But bridging the chasm between
thought and action in the legal system is never simply a matter of will.
The gap between understanding and action roughly corresponds to differ-
ences in institutional roles and to the division of labor and of responsibil-
ity that these roles represent. Thus, what may be described as a problem
of will with respect to the individual becomes, in an institutional context,
primarily a problem in social organization. Elsewhere I have labeled the
specialized understanding of this relation, between the interpretation of
the judge and the social organization required to transform it into a real-
See H. ARENDT, supra note 24, at 14; see also J. SEARLE, SPEECH Acrs (1969).
26. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-106 (1961). Dworkin has ably challenged the
supposedly central role of secondary rules in a theory of law. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
ousi.y (1977). Dworkin's critique is most telling in undermining the idea that rules of recognition
adequately account for certain principles which have the effect of law. See also Cover, supra note 2.
However, some secondary rules of recognition are designed not to generate recognition of content of
rules or principles but to recognize outcomes that are to be effectuated. That is, some secondary rules
organize social cooperation in the violent deeds of the law. By and large the secondary rules that
organize the law's violence are clearer and more hierarchical than those that organize the ideational
content of the law. For an excellent review of the significance of Dworkin's position for the viability
of legal positivism as a system, see Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 139
(1982).
27. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 26, at 105-30; see also infra note 61.
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ity, the hermeneutic of the texts of jurisdiction."' This specialized under-
standing must lie at the heart of official judging.
B. Interpretation within a System Designed to Generate Violence
The gulf between thought and action widens wherever serious violence
is at issue, because for most of us, evolutionary, psychological, cultural
and moral considerations inhibit the infliction of pain on other people. Of
course, these constraints are neither absolute nor universal. There are
some deviant individuals whose behavior is inconsistent with such inhibi-
tions.2" Furthermore, almost all people are fascinated and attracted by vi-
olence, even though they are at the same time repelled by it.30 Finally,
and most important for our purposes, in almost all people social cues may
overcome or suppress the revulsion to violence under certain circum-
stances.31 These limitations do not deny the force of inhibitions against
violence. Indeed, both together create the conditions without which law
would either be unnecessary or impossible. Were the inhibition against
violence perfect, law would be unnecessary; were it not capable of being
overcome through social signals, law would not be possible.
Because legal interpretation is as a practice incomplete without vio-
lence-because it depends upon the social practice of violence for its effi-
cacy-it must be related in a strong way to the cues that operate to by-
pass or suppress the psycho-social mechanisms that usually inhibit peo-
ple's actions causing pain and death. Interpretations which occasion vio-
lence are distinct from the violent acts they occasion. When judges inter-
pret the law in an official context, we expect a close relationship to be
revealed or established between their words and the acts that they man-
date. That is, we expect the judges' words to serve as virtual triggers for
action. We would not, for example, expect contemplations or deliberations
28. Cover, supra note 2, at 53-60.
29. There are persons whose behavior is both violent toward others and apparently reckless in
disregard of violent consequences to themselves. Moreover, this behavior is frequently accompanied by
a strange lack of affect. The classification of such persons as suffering from mental illness is a matter
of great dispute. Nonetheless, at the present time there are a variety of labels that may be appropri-
ately applied on the basis of one authority or another. See, e.g., AM. PSYCHIATRIC Assoc., DIAGNOS-
TIC: AND STArSTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERs 317-21 (3d ed. 1980) (diagnosing persons
similar to those described above as suffering from "antisocial personality disorder"). For some earlier
classifications, see W. M(:CORD & J. MCCORD, THE PSYCHOPATH 39-55 (1964).
30. See, e.g., C. FORD & F. BEACH, PATTERNS OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 64-65 (1951) (varying
cultural responses to linking pain and sexuality). Whether there is a deeper sado-masochistic attrac-
tion to pain or violence involving more serious forms of imposition or suffering of pain that is simi-
larly universal is a matter of dispute. The attraction to violence may also be accounted for in terms of
an impulse of "aggression." See generally K. LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION (M. Wilson trans. 1966).
31. See, e.g., S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974). The Milgram experiments are
discussed and placed in the context of a much larger body of experimental work and anecdotal mate-
rial on decisionmaking in I. JANIS & L. MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
OF CONFI.IC"rS, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT 268-71 (1977).
1613
The Yale Law Journal
on the part of jailers and wardens to interfere with the action authorized
by judicial words. But such a routinization of violent behavior requires a
form of organization that operates simultaneously in the domains of action
and interpretation. In order to understand the violence of a judge's inter-
pretive act, we must also understand the way in which it is transformed
into a violent deed despite general resistance to such deeds; in order to
comprehend the meaning of this violent deed, we must also understand in
what way the judge's interpretive act authorizes and legitimates it.
While it is hardly possible to suggest a comprehensive review of the
possible ways in which the organization of the legal system operates to
facilitate overcoming inhibitions against intraspecific violence, I do wish to
point to some of the social codes which limit these inhibitions. Here the
literature of social psychology is helpful. The best known study and the-
ory of social codes and their role in overcoming normal inhibitions against
inflicting pain through violence is Milgram's Obedience to Authority.32 In
the Milgram experiments, subjects administered what they thought were
actually painful electric shocks to persons who they thought were the ex-
perimental subjects. This was done under the direction or orders of sup-
posed experimenters. The true experimental subjects-those who adminis-
tered the shocks-showed a disturbingly high level of compliance with
authority figures despite the apparent pain evinced by the false experi-
mental subjects. From the results of his experiment, Milgram has formu-
lated a theory that is in some respects incomplete. The most developed
part of the theory relies heavily on the distinction he draws between act-
ing in an "autonomous" state and acting in an "agentic" state. Milgram
posits the evolution of a human disposition to act "agentically" within
hierarchies, since the members of organized hierarchies were traditionally
more likely to survive than were members of less organized social groups.
Concurrently, the "conscience" or "superego" evolved in response to the
need for autonomous behavior or judgment given the evolution of social
structures. It is this autonomous behavior which inhibits the infliction of
pain on others. But the regulators for individual autonomous behavior had
to be capable of being suppressed or subordinated to the characteristics of
agentic behavior when individuals acted within an hierarchical struc-
ture.33 In addition to his theories of species-specific evolutionary mecha-
nisms, Milgram also points to the individual-specific and culture-specific
forms of learning and conditioning for agentic behavior within hierarchi-
cal structures. Thus, in Milgram's explanation of the "agentic state," "in-
stitutional systems of authority" play a key role in providing the requisite
32. S. MILGRAM, supra note 31.
33. Id. at 135-38. Milgram even suggests that there may be chemoneurological regulators of that
subordination.
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cues for causing the shift from autonomous behavior to the agentic behav-
ior cybernetically required to make hierarchies work."' According to Mil-
gram, the cues for overcoming autonomous behavior or "conscience" con-
sist of the institutionally sanctioned commands, orders, or signals of
institutionally legitimated authorities characteristic of human hierarchical
organization.35
There are, of course, a variety of alternative ways to conceptualize the
facilitation of violence through institutional roles. One could point, for ex-
ample, to the theory that human beings have a natural tendency, an in-
stinctual drive, to aggression, and that a variety of learned behaviors keep
aggression within bounds. The institutionally specified occasions for vio-
lence may then be seen as outlets for the aggression that we ordinarily
would seek to exercise but for the restraints. Some scholars have, from a
psychoanalytic perspective, hypothesized that formal structures for the
perpetration of violence permit many individuals to deny themselves the
fulfillment of aggressive wishes by "delegating" the violent activity to
others.3 6
There is an enormous difference between Milgram's theory of institu-
tionalized violence and Anna Freud's or Konrad Lorenz's, and between
the assumptions about human nature which inform them. But common to
all of these theories is a behavioral observation in need of explanation.
Persons who act within social organizations that exercise authority act vi-
olently without experiencing the normal inhibitions or the normal degree
of inhibition which regulates the behavior of those who act autonomously.
When judges interpret, they trigger agentic behavior within just such an
institution or social organization. On one level judges may appear to be,
and may in fact be, offering their understanding of the normative world to
their intended audience. But on another level they are engaging a violent
mechanism through which a substantial part of their audience loses its
capacity to think and act autonomously.
34. Id. at 123-64.
35. Id. at 125-30, 143-48. Milgram also quite properly subjects his theory to the question of
whether the behavior elicited in his experiments might be better explained by postulating a general
impulse or tendency to aggression which is built into the human being and which is normally sup-
pressed by social factors. The experiments might then be understood as opportunities created by the
removal of the social constraints upon violence for the pre-existing aggression to emerge. Id. at
165-68. It is not clear that the two theories are mutually exclusive.
36. Anna Freud follows Stone in calling the phenomenon "delegation." "The individual denies
himself the fulfillment of aggressive wishes but concedes permission for it to some higher agency such
as the state, the police, the military or legal authorities." A. Freud, Comments on Aggression, in
PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY OF NORMAL DEVELOPMENT 161 (1981) (Vol. VIII of THE WRrr-
INGS OF ANNA FREUD). I am indebted to Diane Cover for this reference.
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C. Interpretation and the Effective Organization of Violence
A third factor separates the authorization of violence as a deliberative,
interpretive exercise from the deed. Deeds of violence are rarely suffered
by the victim apart from a setting of domination.37 That setting may be
manifestly coercive and violent or it may be the product of a history of
violence which conditions the expectations of the actors. The imposition of
violence depends upon the satisfaction of the social preconditions for its
effectiveness. Few of us are courageous or foolhardy enough to act vio-
lently in an uncompromisingly principled fashion without attention to the
likely responses from those upon whom we would impose our wills.3 8
If legal interpretation entails action in a field of pain and death, we
must expect, therefore, to find in the act of interpretation attention to the
conditions of effective domination. To the extent that effective domination
is not present, either our understanding of the law will be adjusted so that
it will require only that which can reasonably be expected from people in
conditions of reprisal, resistance and revenge,39 or there will be a crisis of
37. My colleague, Harlon Dalton, reports a view among some people who have clerked for judges
on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that the judges seem reluctant to affirm convictions from the
bench when they believe the defendant to be in the courtroom. Dalton suggests two reasons for the
tendency to reserve decision in such cases. First, the judges desire to give the appearance of delibera-
tion in order to minimize, to the extent possible, the loser's dissatisfaction with the outcome; second,
and more important, the judges desire to avoid having a disgruntled defendant (whose inhibitions
against perpetrating violence are not what they might be) decide to "approach the bench," as it were.
Dalton relates the scene he witnessed when clerking for a then-quite-new district judge who made the
mistake of pronouncing sentence in the small robing room behind the courtroom. (The courtroom was
temporarily unavailable for one reason or another.) The defendant's request that his family be present
during sentencing was of course granted. As a result, the judge had to confront a weeping wife,
dejected children, a lawyer who was now able to emote on an intimate stage, and a defendant who
was able to give his allocution eye-to-eye with the judge from a distance of, at most, ten feet. It was
impossible, therefore, for the judge to hide or insulate himself from the violence that would flow from
the words he was about to utter, and he was visibly shaken as he pronounced sentence. Even so,
neither he nor Dalton was prepared for what followed. The defendant began alternately shouting and
begging the judge to change his mind; his wife began sobbing loudly; the defendant lurched forward
with no apparent purpose in mind except, literally, to get to the judge who was doing this awful thing
to him. Because the seating in the robing room was not designed with security in mind, it took the
marshall a moment or two-a long moment or two-to restrain the defendant. Then, because the
room's only exit was behind where the defendant and his family had been seated, the judge had to
wait until they were, respectively, forced and importuned to leave before he could make his exit, thus
witnessing first hand how his words were translated into deeds. I am grateful to Harlon Dalton for
these accounts.
38. It is the fantasy of so acting which accounts for the attraction of so many violent heroes.
Where systems of deterrence and justice do in fact depend, or have depended, upon high risk acts of
violence, there have been great temptations to avoid too high principles. In many feuding societies the
principle social problem appears not to have been how to stop feuds, but how to get reluctant protago-
nists to act in such a manner as to protect vulnerable members or avenge them. Miller, Choosing the
Avenger: Some Aspects of the Bloodfeud in Medieval Iceland and England, 1 LAW AND HsT. REv.
159, 160-62, 175 (1983).
39. See the corpus of Miller's work on the Icelandic feuds. Id. at 175-94. See also W. Miller,
Gift, Sale, Payment, Raid: Case Studies in the Negotiation and Classification of Exchange in Medie-
val Iceland, 61 SPECUILUM 18-50 (1986); cf. E. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 18 (1984) ("Honor and legalism. . . are
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credibility. The law may come over time to bear only an uncertain rela-
tion to the institutionally implemented deeds it authorizes. Some systems,
especially religious ones, can perpetuate and even profit from a dichotomy
between an ideal law and a realizable one.40 But such a dichotomy has
immense implications if built into the law. In our own secular legal sys-
tem, one must assume this to be an undesirable development.
D. Legal Interpretation as Bonded Interpretation
Legal interpretation, therefore, can never be "free;" it can never be the
function of an understanding of the text or word alone. Nor can it be a
simple function of what the interpreter conceives to be merely a reading of
the "social text," a reading of all relevant social data. Legal interpretation
must be capable of transforming itself into action; it must be capable of
overcoming inhibitions against violence in order to generate its requisite
deeds; it must be capable of massing a sufficient degree of violence to deter
reprisal and revenge.
In order to maintain these critical links to effective violent behavior,
legal interpretation must reflexively consider its own social organization.
In so reflecting, the interpreter thereby surrenders something of his inde-
pendence of mind and autonomy of judgment, since the legal meaning that
some hypothetical Hercules (Hyporcules) might construct out of the sea of
our legal and social texts is only one element in the institutional practice
we call law. Coherent legal meaning is an element in legal interpretation.
But it is an element potentially in tension with the need to generate effec-
tive action in a violent context. And neither effective action nor coherent
meaning can be maintained, separately or together, without an entire
structure of social cooperation. Thus, legal interpretation is a form of
bonded interpretation, bound at once to practical application (to the deeds
it implies) and to the ecology of jurisdictional roles (the conditions of ef-
fective domination). The bonds are reciprocal. For the deeds of social vio-
lence as we know them also require that they be rendered intelligi-
ble-that they be both subject to interpretation and to the specialized and
constrained forms of behavior that are "roles." And the behavior within
roles that we expect can neither exist without the interpretations which
explain the otherwise meaningless patterns of strong action and inaction,
incompatible ....").
40. For example, the account of the dispute within Shi'ite legal theory as to whether it was per-
missible to set up an avowedly Shiah government before the advent of the Twelfth Imam reflects this
dichotomy in a religious context. See R. MOTTAHEDEH, THE MANTLE OF THE PROPHET: RELIGION
AND POLITU-s IN IRAN 172-73 (1985). According to Shi'ite belief, only the advent of this "Imam of
the age" would bring the possibility of a perfect Islamic political community. Id. at 92-93.
1617
The Yale Law Journal
nor be intelligible without understanding the deeds they are designed to
effectuate.
Legal interpretation may be the act of judges or citizens, legislators or
presidents, draft resisters or right-to-life protesters. Each kind of inter-
preter speaks from a distinct institutional location. Each has a differing
perspective on factual and moral implications of any given understanding
of the Constitution. The understanding of each will vary as roles and
moral commitments vary. But considerations of word, deed, and role will
always be present in some degree. The relationships among these three
considerations are created by the practical, violent context of the practice
of legal interpretation, and therefore constitute the most significant aspect
of the legal interpretive process.
III. INTERPRETATION AND EFFECTIVE ACTION: THE CASE OF
CRIMINAL SENTENCING
The bonded character of legal interpretation can be better appreciated
by further unpacking a standard judicial act-the imposition of a sentence
in a criminal case-this time from the judge's perspective. Such an act has
few of the problematic remedial and role complications that have occupied
commentators on the judicial role with regard to affirmative relief in insti-
tutional reform litigation or complex "political questions" cases."' In im-
posing sentences in criminal cases, judges are doing something clearly
within their province. I do not mean to suggest that there are not dis-
agreements about how the act should be carried out-whether with much
or little discretion, whether attending more to objective and quantifiable
criteria or to subjective and qualitative ones. But the act is and long has
been a judicial one, and one which requires no strange or new modes of
interaction with other officials or citizens.
Taken for granted in this judicial act is the structure of cooperation that
ensures, we hope, the effective domination of the present and prospective
victim of state violence-the convicted defendant. The role of judge be-
comes dangerous, indeed, whenever the conditions for domination of the
prisoner and his allies are absent. Throughout history we have seen the
products of ineffective domination in occasional trials in our country and
in many instances in other nations.42 The imposition of a sentence thus
41. My argument is not simply that there are prudential considerations in some sub-class of cases
that render it wise or politic or necessary for the judge to defer to supposed wishes or policies of other
political actors. Rather, my point here is that in every act-even one thought to "belong" to
judges-there is a necessary element of deference to the requirements of transforming judicial thought
into violent action.
42. Ineffective domination has resulted, for example, in the extraordinary security precautions
that take place in the more significant mafia trials in Italy. It is reflected in the failures of Weimar
justice. See P. GAY, WEIMAR CULTURE: THE OUTSIDER AS INSIDER 20-21 (1968). We ought not to
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involves the roles of police, jailers or other enforcers who will restrain the
prisoner (or set him free subject to effective conditions for future restraint)
upon the order of the judge, and guards who will secure the prisoner from
rescue and who will protect the judge, prosecutors, witnesses and jailers
from revenge.
The judge in imposing a sentence normally takes for granted the role
structure which might be analogized to the "transmission" of the engine of
justice. The judge's interpretive authorization of the "proper" sentence
can be carried out as a deed only because of these others; a bond between
word and deed obtains only because a system of social cooperation exists.
That system guarantees the judge massive amounts of force-the condi-
tions of effective domination-if necessary. It guarantees-or is supposed
to-a relatively faithful adherence to the word of the judge in the deeds
carried out against the prisoner.
A. Revealing Latent Role Factors
If the institutional structure-the system of roles-gives the judge's un-
derstanding its effect, thereby transforming understanding into "law," so
it confers meaning on the deeds which effect this transformation, thereby
legitimating them as "lawful." A central task of the legal interpreter is to
attend to the problematic aspects of the integration of role, deed, and
word, not only where the violence (i.e., enforcement) is lacking for mean-
ing, but also where meaning is lacking for violence.
In a nation like ours, in which the conditions of state domination are
rarely absent, it is too easy to assume that there will be faithful officials to
carry out what the judges decree, and judges available to render their acts
lawful. Just how crucial this taken-for-granted structure is may be appre-
ciated by examining a case in which it is lacking. The decisions by Judge
Herbert Stern in United States v. Tiede4 display an unusually lucid ap-
preciation of the significance of the institutional connections between the
judicial word and the violent deeds it authorizes.
Judge Stern was (and is) a federal district judge in New Jersey. In 1979
he was appointed an Article II judge for the United States Court for Ber-
lin. This unique event, the only convening of the Court for Berlin, was a
response to the reluctance of West Germany to prosecute two skyjackers
assume that our own legal system is entirely free from such problems. While judges, on the whole,
have fared remarkably well given the number of people whom they injure, there are occasional in-
slances of violence directed at judges. And the problem of protecting witnesses is a persistent and
serious one for the criminal justice system.
43. 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin 1979). The reported opinion encompasses only certain
procedural questions that arose in the trial, primarily the question of whether the defendants were
entitled to a jury trial. A comprehensive account of the trial and the various rulings made during its
course can be found in H. STE.RN, JUDGMENT IN BERLIN (1984).
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who had used a toy gun to threaten the crew of a Polish airliner en route
from Gdansk to East Berlin and had forced it to land in West Berlin. The
formal status of Berlin as an "occupied" city enabled the Germans to
place the responsibility for prosecution of the skyjacker-refugees upon the
Americans."
Stern wrote a moving account of the unusual trial which ensued, in-
cluding his long struggle with the United States government over the gen-
eral question of whether the Constitution of the United States would gov-
ern the proceedings. After a jury trial, opposed by the prosecution, and a
verdict of guilty on one of the charges, Stern was required to perform the
"simple" interpretive act of imposing the appropriate sentence. As a mat-
ter of interpreting the governing materials on sentencing it might indeed
have been a "simple" act-one in which relatively unambiguous German
law was relatively unambiguously to be applied by virtue of American
law governing a court of occupation.
45
Stern brilliantly illuminated the defects in such a chain of reasoning.
The judicial interpretive act in sentencing issues in a deed-the actual
performance of the violence of punishment upon a defendant. But these
two-judicial word and punitive deed-are connected only by the social
cooperation of many others, who in their roles as lawyers, police, jailers,
wardens, and magistrates perform the deeds which judicial words author-
ize. Cooperation among these officials is usually simply assumed to be
present, but, of course, the conditions which normally ensure the success
of this cooperation may fail in a variety of ways.
This is Judge Stern's account of his sentencing of the defendant, Hans
Detlef Alexander Tiede:
Gentlemen [addressing the State Department and Justice Depart-
ment lawyers], I will not give you this defendant. . . . I have kept
him in your custody now for nine months, nearly. . . . You have
persuaded me. I believe, now, that you recognize no limitations of
due process ...
I don't have to be a great prophet to understand that there is
probably not a great future for the United States Court for Berlin
here. [Stern had just been officially "ordered" not to proceed with a
civil case brought against the United States in Stern's Court. The
case was a last ditch attempt in a complicated proceeding in which
44. H. STERN, supra note 43, at 3-61.
45. There were several significant interpretive issues involved in the sentencing other than the one
treated below: for example, whether an offer of a deal by the prosecution to the defendant in return
for not persisting with the demand for a jury trial should operate to limit any sentence imposed to one
no more severe than the proffered deal, id. at 344-45, and whether the judge was obligated to apply
German law which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of three years for the offense of which
Tiede was convicted, id. at 350-55.
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the West Berlin government had acquired park land-allegedly in
violation of German law-for construction of a housing complex for
the United States Army Command in Berlin. The American occupa-
tion officials had refused to permit the German courts to decide the
case as it affected the interests of the occupation authority. American
Ambassador Walter Stoessel had officially written Stern on the day
before the sentencing that "your appointment as a Judge of the
United States Court for Berlin does not extend to this matter. ' '4" l
Under those circumstances, who will be here to protect Tiede if I
give him to you for four years? Viewing the Constitution as non-
existent, considering yourselves not restrained in any way, who will
stand between you and him? What judge? What independent magis-
trate do you have here? What independent magistrate will you per-
mit here?
When a judge sentences, he commits a defendant to the cus-
tody-in the United States he says, 'I commit to the custody of the
Attorney General of the United States'-et cetera. Here I suppose he
says, I commit to the custody of the Commandant, or the Secretary
of State, or whatever . . . . I will not do it. Not under these
circumstances ...
I sentence this defendant to time served. You . . .are a free man
right now.4
Herbert Stern's remarkable sentence is not simply an effective, moving
plea for judicial independence, a plea against the subservience which
Stern's government tried to impose. It is a dissection of the anatomy of
criminal punishment in a constitutional system. As such, it reveals the
interior role of the judicial word in sentencing. It reveals the necessity of a
latent role structure to render the judicial utterance morally intelligible.
And it proclaims the moral unintelligibility of routine judicial utterance
when the structure is no longer there. Almost all judicial utterance be-
comes deed through the acts of others-acts embedded in roles. The judge
must see, as Stern did, that the meaning of her words may change when
the roles of these others change. We tend overwhelmingly to assume that
constitutional violence is always performed within institutionally sanc-
tioned limits and subject to the institutionally circumscribed, role-bound
action of others. Stern uncovered the unreliability of that assumption in
the Berlin context and "reinterpreted" his sentence accordingly.48
46. Id. at 353.
47. Id. at 370.
48. Judge Stern confronted an unusual situation-no independent system of courts, and no ex-
plicit denial by those in control of official violence that their power was constitutionally limited. In a
sense the situation was one of de jure lawlessness. But Stem's reasoning reaches beyond the case at
hand; it may be extended to include, for example, the defacto state of lawlessness that attends life in
many United States prisons. Institutional reform litigation-whether applied to prisons, schools, or
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B. The Death Sentence as an Interpretive Act of Violence
The questions of whether the death sentence is constitutionally permis-
sible and, if it is, whether to impose it, are among the most difficult
problems a judge encounters. While the grammar of the capital sentence
may appear to be similar to that of any other criminal sentence, the capi-
tal sentence as interpretive act is unique in at least three ways. The judge
must interpret those constitutional and other legal texts which speak to
the question of the proper or permissible occasions for imposition of a
capital sentence. She must understand the texts in the context of an appli-
cation that prescribes the killing of another person. And she must act to
set in motion the acts of others which will in the normal course of events
end with someone else killing the convicted defendant. Our judges do not
ever kill the defendants themselves. They do not witness the execution.
Yet, they are intensely aware of the deed their words authorize.
49
The confused and emotional situation which now prevails with respect
to capital punishment in the United States is in several ways a product of
what I have described as the bonded character of legal interpretation-the
complex structure of relationships between word and deed. To any person
endowed with the normal inhibitions against the imposition of pain and
death, the deed of capital punishment entails a special measure of the
reluctance and abhorrence which constitute the gulf that must be bridged
between interpretation and action. Because in capital punishment the ac-
tion or deed is extreme and irrevocable, there is pressure placed on the
word-the interpretation that establishes the legal justification for the
act.50 At the same time, the fact that capital punishment constitutes the
most plain, the most deliberate, and the most thoughtful manifestation of
legal interpretation as violence makes the imposition of the sentence an
especially powerful test of the faith and commitment of the interpreters.
51
hospitals-entails complex questions of judicial remedial power. Very often these questions are
framed around problems of discretion in the administration of remedies. When deciding whether to
issue an injunction, judges often "interpret" the law in light of the difficulties involved in effectuating
their judgments. But Stem's decision in Tiede pursues a different path. A judge may or may not be
able to change the deeds of official violence, but she may always withhold the justification for this
violence. She may or may not be able to bring a good prison into being, but she can refrain from
sentencing anyone to a constitutionally inadequate one. Some judges have in fact followed this course.
See, e.g., Barnes v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. 1218 (D.V.I. 1976).
49. Contrast the discreet distance judges now keep from capital sentences with the pageant of
capital punishment in Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE:
CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 28-29 (1975).
50. This pressure for more certain justification of the death sentence lies behind the development
of the "super due process" position with regard to death penalty cases. See, e.g., Radin, Cruel Punish-
ment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1980)
(describing Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment procedural safeguards). No more powerful statement
of the ultimate implications of this position is to be found than in C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:
THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (2d ed. 1981).
51. The decade-long moratorium on death sentences may quite intelligibly be understood as a
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Not even the facade of civility, where it exists, can obscure the violence of
a death sentence.
Capital cases, thus, disclose far more of the structure of judicial inter-
pretation than do other cases. Aiding this disclosure is the agonistic char-
acter of law: The defendant and his counsel search for and exploit any
part of the structure that may work to their advantage. And they do so to
an extreme degree in a matter of life and death.52
Thus, in the typical capital case in the United States, the judge is con-
stantly reminded of that which the defense constantly seeks to exploit: The
structure of interdependent roles that Judge Stern found to be potentially
lacking in Berlin in the Tiede case. Consider. Not only do the actors in
these roles carry out the judicial decision-they await it! All of them know
that the judges will be called upon, time and again, to consider exhaus-
tively all interpretive avenues that the defense counsel might take to avoid
the sentence. And they expect that no capital sentence will in fact be car-
ried out without several substantial delays during which judges consider
some defense not yet fully decided by that or other courts.53 The almost
stylized action of the drama requires that the jailers stand visibly ready to
receive intelligence of the judicial act-even if it be only the act of decid-
ing to take future action. The stay of execution, though it be noth-
ing-literally nothing-as an act of textual exegesis, nonetheless consti-
tutes an important form of constitutional interpretation. For it shows the
violence of the warden and executioner to be linked to the judge's deliber-
ative act of understanding. The stay of execution, the special line open,
permits, or more accurately, requires the inference to be drawn from the
failure of the stay of execution. That too is the visible tie between word
and deed. 4 These wardens, these guards, these doctors, jump to the
failure of will on the part of a majority of the Court which had, at some point in that period, decided
both that there was to be no general constitutional impediment to the imposition of the death sentence,
and that they were not yet prepared to see the states begin a series of executions. Of course, through-
out the period, new procedural issues were arising. But it does not seem far-fetched to suppose that
there was also a certain squeamishness about facing the implications of the majority position on the
constitutional issue. See Note, Summary Processes and the Rule of Law- Expediting Death Penalty
Cases in the Federal Courts, 95 YAI.E L.J. 349, 354 (1985) (citing Court's "often uncertain and
tortuous" death penalty jurisprudence during this period).
52. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Wainwright, 464 U.S. 109, 112 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring in
denial of stay) (Chief Justice Burger accused death penalty lawyers of turning "the administration of
justice into a sporting contest").
53. The current Court (or a majority of it) is very hostile to such delays. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880 (1983), Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983),
and Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983), mark a reversal of the trend to permit or encourage a
full hearing of all plausible claims or defenses. Nonetheless, even with this new impatience to be on
with the execution, there are usually substantial delays at some point before execution.
54. Consider the opinions of the various Justices in Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273
(1953), vacating, in special term, the stay of the sentence of death that had been granted by Justice
Douglas. For an analysis of the deliberations, see Parrish, Cold War Justice: The Supreme Court and
the Rosenbergs, 82 AM. HIST. REv. 805-42 (1977).
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judge's tune. If the deed is done, it is a constitutional deed-one integrated
to and justifiable under the proper understanding of the word. In short, it
is the stay, the drama of the possibility of the stay, that renders the execu-
tion constitutional violence, that makes the deed an act of interpretation.
For, after all, executions I can find almost anywhere. If people disap-
pear, if they die suddenly and without ceremony in prison, quite apart
from any articulated justification and authorization for their demise, then
we do not have constitutional interpretation at the heart of this deed, nor
do we have the deed, the death, at the heart of the Constitution. The
problem of incapacity or unwillingness to ensure a strong, virtually cer-
tain link between judicial utterance and violent deed in this respect char-
acterizes certain legal systems at certain times.
5 5 It characterized much of
the American legal system well into the twentieth century; lynching, for
example, was long thought to be a peculiarly American scandal.
58 It was a
scandal which took many forms. Often it entailed taking the punishment
of alleged offenders out of the hands of courts entirely. But sometimes it
entailed the carrying out of death sentences without abiding by the or-
dered processes of appeals and post-conviction remedies. Such was the
outcome, for example, of the notorious "Leo Frank" 
case.5
The plain fact is that we have come a good way since 1914 with respect
to our expectations that persons accused of capital crimes will be given a
trial, will be sentenced properly, and will live to see the appointed time of
the execution of their sentence. In fact, we have come to expect near per-
fect coordination of those whose role it is to inflict violence subject to the
interpretive decisions of the judges. We have even come to expect coordi-
nated cooperation in securing all plausible judicial interpretations on the
subject."'
Such a well-coordinated form of violence is an achievement. The care-
55. See, e.g., R. BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE, HISTORICAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN VIOLENCE
AND VIGILANTISM 144-79 (1975) (discussing legal attitudes toward American vigilantism).
56. See R. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950, at 9-11
(1980).
57. Leo Frank was a Jewish New Yorker managing a pencil factory in Georgia. He was 
accused
of having raped and murdered a 14-year-old employee of the factory. The trial (and conviction) 
took
place amidst a mob atmosphere in which the Court was required to warn the defendant 
and his
counsel not to be present in the courtroom at the rendering of the verdict lest they 
be violently
harmed. After Frank's conviction he was forcibly removed from a prison labor gang and lynched. 
The
case was instrumental in the formation of the B'nai Brith Anti-Defamation League. Collateral 
relief
was denied by the Supreme Court in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), over the strong dissent
of Justice Holmes and Justice Hughes.
58. I am not, of course, suggesting that unauthorized violence on the part of police, jailers, etc., no
longer exists. But the quasi-public position that the "justice" of the mob should supplant the ordered
process of the courts is no longer prevalent. See the extraordinary article by Charles Bonaparte, 
Lynch
Law and its Remedy, 8 YALE L.J. 335, 336 (1899) (arguing that underlying purpose of lynching 
is
"not to violate, but to vindicate, the law; or, to speak more accurately, . • • its 'adjective' part . . . is
disregarded that its 'substantiative' [sic] part may be preserved").
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ful social understandings designed to accomplish the violence that is capi-
tal punishment, or to refrain from that act, are not fortuitous or casual
products of circumstance. Rather, they are the products of design, tied
closely to the secondary rules and principles which provide clear criteria
for the recognition of these and other interpretive acts as, first and fore-
most, judicial acts. Their "meaning" is always secondary to their prov-
enance. No wardens, guards or executioners wait for a telephone call from
the latest constitutional law scholar, jurisprude or critic before executing
prisoners, no matter how compelling the interpretations of these others
may be. And, indeed, they await the word of judges only insofar as that
word carries with it the formal indicia of having been spoken in the judi-
cial capacity. The social cooperation critical to the constitutional form of
cooperation in violence is, therefore, also predicated upon the recognition
of the judicial role and the recognition of the one whose utterance per-
forms it.
There are, of course, some situations in which the judicial role is not
well-defined but is contested. Nonetheless, social cooperation in constitu-
tional violence as we know it requires at least that it be very clear who
speaks as a judge and when. The hierarchical ordering among judicial
voices must also be clear or subject to clarification. We have established,
then, the necessity for rules and principles that locate authoritative inter-
preters and prescribe action on the basis of what they say. The rules and
principles that locate authoritative voices for the purposes of action point
to the defect in a model of judicial interpretation that centers around a
single coherent and consistent mind at work. For here in the United States
there is no set of secondary rules and principles more fundamental than
those which make it impossible for any single judge, however Herculean
her understanding of the law, ever to have the last word on legal meaning
as it affects real cases. In the United States-with only trivial excep-
tions-no judge sitting alone on a significant legal issue is immune from
appellate review. Conversely, whenever any judge sits on the court of last
resort on a significant legal issue, that judge does not sit alone. A complex
of secondary rules determines this situation. These rules range from the
statutes which generally give a right to at least one appeal from final
judgments of trial courts, to special statutes which require that there be
appellate review of death sentences, to the constitutional guarantee that
the writ of habeas corpus not be suspended.59 Final appellate courts in the
United States have always had at least three judges. Some state constitu-
59. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) (providing for appeals as of right from final decisions of
district courts); id. §§ 46(b), 46(c) (providing for hearing of cases by U.S. Courts of Appeals in panels
of three judges unless rehearing en banc is ordered); U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 9, ci. 2 (protecting writ of
habeus corpus).
1625
The Yale Law Journal
tions specify the number. No explicit provision in the United States Con-
stitution defines the Supreme Court in such a way that requires that it be
made up of more than a single judge. But both invariant practice and
basic understandings since 1789 have made the idea of a single-Justice
Supreme Court a practical absurdity. Given the clarity of the expectation
that Supreme judicial bodies be plural, it seems doubtful to me whether
such an imaginary Court should be held to satisfy the constitutional re-
quirement that there be a Supreme Court."0
If some hypothetical Herculean judge should achieve an understanding
of constitutional and social texts-an interpretation-such that she felt the
death penalty to be a permissible and appropriate punishment in a partic-
ular case, she would be confronted at once with the problem of translating
that conviction into a deed. Her very understanding of the constitutional-
ity of the death penalty and the appropriateness of its imposition would
carry with it-as part of the understanding-the knowledge that she could
not carry out the sentence herself. The most elementary understanding of
our social practice of violence ensures that a judge know that she herself
cannot actually pull the switch. This is not a trivial convention. For it
means that someone else will have the duty and opportunity to pass upon
what the judge has done. Were the judge a trial judge, and should she
hand down an order to execute, there would be another judge to whom
application could be made to stay or reverse her decision. The fact that
someone else has to carry out the execution means that this someone else
may be confronted with two pieces of paper: let us say a warrant for
execution of the sentence of death at a specified time and place and a stay
of execution from an appellate tribunal. The someone else-the warden,
for simplicity's sake-is expected to determine which of these two pieces
of paper to act upon according to some highly arbitrary, hierarchical prin-
ciples which have nothing to do with the relative merits or demerits of the
arguments which justify the respective substantive positions.
It is crucial to note here that if the warden should cease paying rela-
tively automatic heed to the pieces of paper which flow in from the judges
according to these arbitrary and sometimes rigid hierarchical rules and
principles, the judges would lose their capacity to do violence. They would
be left with only the opportunity to persuade the warden and his men to
do violence. Conversely, the warden and his men would lose their capacity
to shift to the judge primary moral responsibility for the violence which
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (providing for Supreme Court of nine Justices, of whom six constitute a
quorum). The one rather significant historical exception to the generalization in the text gives me
some pause with respect to the conclusion about the constitutionality of a single-Justice Supreme
Court. It is true, of course, that the Chancellor was, in form, a single-justice high court. And, while it
has not been the rule, some American court systems have preserved a chancery, though often with
multi-judge appellate courts in equity.
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they themselves carry out. They would have to pass upon the justifications
for violence in every case themselves, thereby turning the trial into a sort
of preliminary hearing. There are, indeed, many prisons in this world
that bear some resemblance to this hypothetical situation. There are sys-
tems in which the most significant punishment decisions are made by
those who either perform or have direct supervisory authority over the
performance of the violence itself.
We have done something strange in our system. We have rigidly sepa-
rated the act of interpretation-of understanding what ought to be
done-from the carrying out of this "ought to be done" through violence.
At the same time we have, at least in the criminal law, rigidly linked the
carrying out of judicial orders to the act of judicial interpretation by rela-
tively inflexible hierarchies of judicial utterances and firm obligations on
the part of penal officials to heed them. Judges are both separated from,
and inextricably linked to, the acts they authorize.
This strange yet familiar attribute of judging in America has the effect
of ensuring that no judge acts alone. Ronald Dworkin's "Judge as Hercu-
les"' may appear to be a useful construct for understanding how a
judge's mind ought to work. But it is misleading precisely because it sug-
gests, if it does not require, a context which, in America, is never present.
There may or may not be any sense in thinking about a judicial under-
standing of the law apart from its application. But one thing is near cer-
tain. The application of legal understanding in our domain of pain and
death will always require the active or passive acquiescence of other judi-
cial minds. It is possible to wear this point down to the most trite observa-
tion of professional practice. A judge who wishes to transform her under-
standing into deed must, if located on a trial court, attend to ensuring that
her decision not be reversed. If on an appellate court, she must attend to
getting at least one other judge to go along. It is a commonplace that
many "majority" opinions bear the scars or marks of having been written
primarily to keep the majority. Many a trial court opinion bears the scars
of having been written primarily to avoid reversal.
Now the question arises, which is the true act of legal interpretation?
The hypothetical understanding of a single mind placed in the admittedly
hypothetical position of being able to render final judgments sitting alone?
Or the actual products of judges acting under the constraint of potential
group oversight of all decisions that are to be made real through collective
61. Dworkin's Hercules appears first in the article "Hard Cases." Dworkin, Hard Cases, 89
HARV. L. REv. 1057 (1975). Hercules lives on in LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 2, at 239-75, wherein
he assumes the mantle of a model judge of "integrity," which seems not to be primarily a personal
quality for Dworkin but an interpretive posture which values intellectual consistency and coherence.
Id. at 164-67.
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violence? The single decision of a hypothetical Hercules is likely to be
more articulate and coherent than the collective decision of many judges
who may make compromises to arrive at that decision. But Hyporcules
does not and cannot carry the force of collective violence. This defect is
intrinsic to the definition of legal interpretation as a mental activity of a
person rather than as the violent activity of an organization of people.
So let us be explicit. If it seems a nasty thought that death and pain are
at the center of legal interpretation, so be it. It would not be better were
there only a community of argument, of readers and writers of texts, of
interpreters. As long as death and pain are part of our political world, it
is essential that they be at the center of the law. The alternative is truly
unacceptable-that they be within our polity but outside the discipline of
the collective decision rules and the individual efforts to achieve outcomes
through those rules. The fact that we require many voices is not, then, an
accident or peculiarity of our jurisdictional rules. It is intrinsic to
whatever achievement is possible in the domesticating of violence.
CONCLUSION
There is a worthy tradition that would have us hear the judge as a
voice of reason; see her as the embodiment of principle. The current aca-
demic interest in interpretation, the attention to community of meaning
and commitment, is apologetic neither in its intent or effect. The trend is,
by and large, an attempt to hold a worthy ideal before what all would
agree is an unredeemed reality. I would not quarrel with the impulse that
leads us to this form of criticism.
There is, however, danger in forgetting the limits which are intrinsic to
this activity of legal interpretation; in exaggerating the extent to which
any interpretation rendered as part of the act of state violence can ever
constitute a common and coherent meaning. I have emphasized two rather
different kinds of limits to the commonality and coherence of meaning that
can be achieved. One kind of limit is a practical one which follows from
the social organization of legal violence. We have seen that in order to do
that violence safely and effectively, responsibility for the violence must be
shared; law must operate as a system of cues and signals to many actors
who would otherwise be unwilling, incapable or irresponsible in their vio-
lent acts. This social organization of violence manifests itself in the sec-
ondary rules and principles which generally ensure that no single mind
and no single will can generate the violent outcomes that follow from in-
terpretive commitments. No single individual can render any interpreta-
tion operative as law-as authority for the violent act. While a conver-
gence of understandings on the part of all relevant legal actors is not
necessarily impossible, it is, in fact, very unlikely. And, of course, we can-
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not flee from the multiplicity of minds and voices that the social organiza-
tion of law-as-violence requires to some hypothetical decision process that
would aggregate the many voices into one. We know that-aside from
dictatorship-there is no aggregation rule that will necessarily meet ele-
mentary conditions for rationality in the relationships among the social
choices made.
62
While our social decision rules cannot guarantee coherence and ration-
ality of meaning, they can and do generate violent action which may well
have a distinct coherent meaning for at least one of the relevant actors.
We are left, then, in this actual world of the organization of law-as-
violence with decisions whose meaning is not likely to be coherent if it is
common, and not likely to be common if it is coherent.
This practical, contingent limit upon. legal interpretation is, however,
the less important and less profound of the two kinds of limits I have
presented. For if we truly attend to legal interpretation as it is practiced
on the field of fear, pain, and death, we find that the principal impedi-
ment to the achievement of common and coherent meaning is a necessary
limit, intrinsic to the activity. Judges, officials, resisters, martyrs, wardens,
convicts, may or may not share common texts; they may or may not share
a common vocabulary, a common cultural store of gestures and rituals;
they may or may not share a common philosophical framework. There
will be in the immense human panorama a continuum of degrees of com-
monality in all of the above. But as long as legal interpretation is constitu-
tive of violent behavior as well as meaning, as long as people are commit-
ted to using or resisting the social organizations of violence in making
their interpretations real, there will always be a tragic limit to the com-
mon meaning that can be achieved.
The perpetrator and victim of organized violence will undergo achingly
disparate significant experiences. For the perpetrator, the pain and fear
are remote, unreal, and largely unshared. They are, therefore, almost
never made a part of the interpretive artifact, such as the judicial opinion.
On the other hand, for those who impose the violence the justification is
important, real and carefully cultivated. Conversely, for the victim, the
justification for the violence recedes in reality and significance in propor-
tion to the overwhelming reality of the pain and fear that is suffered.
Between the idea and the reality of common meaning falls the shadow
of the violence of law, itself.
62. K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951).
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